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d1.  Introduction 
Improving school performance, especially in poor communities, remains a 
challenge facing most countries (Filmer et al 2006). One policy being examined by many 
developing countries is school based-management (SBM), which decentralizes 
responsibility and decision-making powers to local school management committees 
(World Bank 2007).
1 SBM takes on many different forms, both in terms of who has the 
power to make decisions as well as the degree of decision-making. While some programs 
transfer authority to principals or teachers only, others mandate parental and community 
participation. SBM devolves authority over one or more of the following: budget 
allocation, employment and remuneration of teachers and staff, curriculum development, 
textbook and educational material procurement, infrastructure improvement, school 
calendar, and monitoring and evaluation of teacher and student performance. 
One of the primary reasons proponents support SBM is that decentralizing 
decision-making to the local level is thought to bring decision-making closer to the 
people so that their preferences can be better reflected in policy (Oates 1972; Lockwood 
2002; Besley and Coate 2003 and Besley and Ghatak 2003). The argument is that local 
decision-makers are better able to adapt the appropriate mix of inputs and education 
policies to local preferences, realities, and needs; and are more accountable to their 
constituencies. However, decentralized decision-making policies such as SBM may not 
improve school quality (Galiani et al 2008), when parents lack the ability to make their 
voices heard, when local elites can capture public resources (Bardhan and Mookherjee 
                                                   
1 Parental participation in SBM has long been popular in the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia 
and Canada, and is currently being implemented in a number of countries, including Hong Kong (China), 
Indonesia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic, Nepal, Paraguay and Mexico.  
  22005, 2006), or when SBM groups are less technically able than higher levels of 
government to administer schools (Smith 1985). 
In this paper, we empirically examine a program that includes parents in school 
management in a limited way. Parents, especially of younger children, are the principal 
clients of schools.  They represent the interests of their children and, therefore, have the 
most to gain from better school performance. Participation in management committees 
provides parents a mechanism for them to assert their preferences over the school’s 
operational decisions and policies, and make schools more accountable.
2  T h e i r  
participation allows them to directly monitor principal and teacher effort as well as 
overall school performance and provides a feedback mechanism for them to voice any 
concerns.  
Specifically, we study the impact of an effort to increase parental participation in 
school management in rural Mexico. In 1992, Mexico decentralized educational services 
from the federal to the state level. The federal government complemented school 
decentralization with the Compensatory Education Program designed to equalize 
resources and educational standards across all schools with a focus on disadvantaged 
rural and indigenous schools.  The program included a SBM component – the Support to 
School Management or AGE (Apoyo a la Gestión Escolar). AGE provides small 
monetary grants to parent associations that they can use to invest in infrastructure or in 
materials they deem important for their schools. Parents also receive training in the 
management of these funds and in participatory skills to increase their involvement in 
school activities. Through AGE parents spend more time in the school as well as regular 
                                                   
2 Making schools directly accountable to their clients is the primary intervention to improve school quality 
recommended by the 2004 World Bank’s World Development Report (World Bank 2004). 
  3interaction and greater standing with school directors and teachers. As a result, they are 
better able to monitor the school activities (teacher absenteeism, children attention in 
class, etc) and to voice their opinions on school matters. AGE was the first program that 
gave parents any authority over school matters in Mexico.
3 By 2005 more than 46 
percent of primary schools in Mexico had an AGE. 
                                                  
We examine whether increased parental participation through AGE helped to 
create a more conducive learning environment and thereby improved students’ learning 
outcomes. Through interviews of parents and school directors, we found that they believe 
that AGE have increased parents’ involvement in school-related activities and facilitated 
better communication amongst parents, teachers and principals.  Both parents and school 
directors report that the AGE led to an increase in parental participation in school 
matters. Most parents are interested in teacher effort.  They will, for example, complain 
to principals if teachers are absent. The increased parental presence and oversight in 
schools make schools more accountable to their end users and, therefore, might 
ultimately affect student learning. 
We test this hypothesis by examining the impact of the AGE on intermediate 
school quality indicators – school-level grade failure, grade repetition and intra-year drop 
out rates. We exploit the gradual phasing-in of the AGE intervention over time to identify 
difference in difference estimates of average treatment effects. Results suggest that the 
AGE decreased the proportion of students failing and repeating a grade by about 5 
percent.  
 
3 In 2001, the federal government launched a broader SBM intervention, the Quality Schools Program or 
PEC (Programa Escuelas de Calidad). 
  4This study contributes to a small literature on SBM in developing countries.
4 
Several studies rely on cross-sectional variation, ex-post propensity score matching and 
exclusion restrictions – either using functional forms or weak instrumental variables – 
thus leaving their ability to establish causality open to question.
5 Notable quasi-
experimental exceptions include Shapiro and Skoufias (2005) and Murnane et al (2006) 
who use difference in differences models to estimate the impact of Mexico’s PEC 
(Quality Schools Program) intervention on drop out, repetition and failure rates. Duflo et 
al (2007) uses a randomized experiment to evaluate the effects of monetary 
empowerment of local school management committees to monitor and train teachers 
combined with contract teacher hiring in primary schools in Kenya. They show that 
combining class size reduction with improved incentives – by either hiring contract 
teachers (as opposed to civil servants) or increasing parental oversight – leads to 
significantly larger test scores increases.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  The next section describes 
the AGE intervention in greater detail. In Section 3, we posit the pathways whereby AGE 
might affect parental participation using descriptive information from the qualitative 
interviews. In Section 4 we discuss the identification strategy and data used and present 
the quantitative empirical results. A discussion of potential biases is provided in Section 
5. Section 6 concludes.  
 
 
                                                   
4 Summers and Johnson (1996) review the evidence on the effects of SBM in the United States. 
5 See for example the works of Jimenez and Sawada (1999, 2003) on El Salvador’s EDUCO; DiGropello 
and Marshall (2005) on the effects of the Hondura’s PROHECO program; King and Ozler (1998), King et 
al (1999) and Parker (2005) on Nicaragua’s Autonomous School program; or López-Calva and Espinosa 
(2006) on the impacts of AGE as well as the other Compensatory Program supports on test scores. 
  52.  The AGE Program 
AGE is part of a broader school reform designed to improve the supply and 
quality of education in schools in highly disadvantaged communities. The Compensatory 
Program consists of: (i) infrastructure improvement, (ii) provision of school equipment , 
(iii) provision of materials for students (e.g. notebooks, pens, etc), (iv) pedagogical 
training for teachers, (v) performance based monetary incentives for teachers, and (vi) 
AGE. Not all of the sub-interventions were introduced at the same time and not all of the 
schools received all of the sub-interventions. 
The Compensatory Program progressively expanded from more to less 
disadvantaged areas. Between 1992 and 1995, the program was introduced in the poorest 
municipalities of the poorest 23 states.
6 Coverage was extended to disadvantaged schools 
in the eight remaining Mexican states in 1998. We use data from schools incorporated 
starting in 1998 in our analysis.  They have lower poverty rates and better educational 
outcomes than the States incorporated earlier. The worst performing schools were 
targeted using an index based on (i) a community marginality index (ii) teacher-student 
ratios (iii) the number of students per school and (iv) repetition and grade failure rates.
7 
Each State then decided which sub-interventions would be allocated to which school 
based on their budget and logistic capacity.  
AGE as a sub-intervention was first introduced in the 1996-97 school year. AGE 
finances and support the schools’ parent associations. The monetary support varies from 
$500 to $700 per year depending on school size.  The use of funds is restricted and 
subject to annual financial audits for a random sample of schools. Amongst other things, 
                                                   
6 Poverty levels are defined according to the marginality index developed by the Population National 
Council or CONAPO (Consejo Nacional de Población). 
7 CONAFE (2000) provides specific details on the weighting of variables to construct the index. 
  6the parents are not allowed to spend money on wages and salaries for teachers.  Most of 
the money goes to infrastructure improvements and small civil works. In return, parents 
must commit to greater involvement in school activities, participate in the infrastructure 
work, and attend training sessions delivered by state educational authorities. In these 
sessions, parents receive training in the management of the funds and in participatory 
skills to increase their involvement in the school.  Parents also receive information on the 
role of the school as an educator, on the role of the schools’ parent association, on their 
children educational achievements and on how to help their children learn.  
 
3.  Did AGE Increase Parental Participation?  
In Mexico, parent associations exist by law but are rather dysfunctional and they 
typically have little or no access to schools. AGE created a need and a right for parents to 
have access to schools to decide on the allocation of the grant, manage the funds 
(establish a feasible budget, record expenses, etc), and participate in infrastructure works 
directly. Hence, the AGE represent the first time that parents are granted full access to the 
schools and are given certain – albeit limited – authority over school matters. We argue 
that this is likely to change parental attitudes towards schooling, attitudes of school 
directors and teachers to parents, and improve overall school climate. Because parents 
now spend time in the school, they are better able to monitor school activities (teacher 
absenteeism, quality of the teaching, kids attention levels, etc) and gather information 
about school performance. Parents are also better able to voice their opinion over general 
resource allocation and school policy.   
In order to substantiate these arguments, we undertook descriptive qualitative 
work along two lines. First, we conducted a series of focus groups with parents in three 
  7AGE and three non-AGE schools in five communities in the Mexican state of 
Campeche.
8  In addition, we carried out a larger qualitative survey of school directors’ 
perceptions in 115 randomly selected AGE schools in the states of Campeche, Guerrero, 
Michoacán, Sinaloa and Tamaulipas.  
The parental focus groups revealed that parents believed that the AGE had indeed 
improved interaction and communication with school directors and teachers resulting in 
better educational outcomes. Parents expressed the view that the AGE helped generate 
and facilitate dialogue between parents, teachers and school directors. Parents in AGE 
beneficiary schools were pleased with the fact that they were better able to meet with 
their child’s teacher and to follow their child’s progress more closely. They reported that 
teacher instructed them on how to improve their child’s performance. They believed that 
this fostered parental involvement in school and with their children’s education. Parents 
also perceived that AGE had a positive impact on teacher effort. When asked what 
impacts they had noticed, parents commented on the fact that teachers stayed longer 
hours in schools to help students who were falling behind academically.  The focus 
groups established that AGE helped parents be vocal representatives of the school clients 
as they articulate demands, generate expectations and promote participation. These 
findings are in line with previous qualitative evidence in the state of Tabasco, which 
revealed that AGE increased parental participation in school activities, improved parent-
teacher relations, and reduced teacher absences (World Bank 2000). 
The survey of school principal confirmed the perception that the AGE led to an 
increase in parental participation in school matters. In fact, all school principals believed 
that this was the case.  When asked about the most important change induced by parental 
                                                   
8 See Patrinos (2006) for full details. 
  8participation, all principals reported positive changes: 40 percent reported increased 
parental concern about their children’s academic performance; another 30 percent 
reported increased parental interest in the school overall; and a final 30 percent reported 
increased interaction between parents and teachers. Indeed, 95 percent of principals 
reported that AGE increased parental interest in the work of teachers. They reported that 
parents follow the work of the teachers closely and complain if they do not like what is 
happening. More than 80 percent of the principals reported that parents complained if 
teachers were absent. Principals also reported that AGE changed parental attitude towards 
their children’s performance in school, with 53 percent reporting increased parental help 
for kids studying and monitoring that the homework was done. Another 42 percent of the 
principals reported that parents increased going to school to talk to teachers and followed 
up on their kids learning. 
Both parents and principal reported that AGE increased parental participation in 
school, made parents more demanding in terms of attention to their children’s learning 
needs and teacher effort, and increased parental involvement with homework. In the 
following section we test whether AGE improved intermediate schooling outcomes and 
provide an estimate of the size of the impact. 
 
4.  Did AGE Reduce Grade Repetition, Grade Failure, and Drop out?  
We estimate the effects of AGE on three educational outcomes: the probability 
that the student fails an exam, repeats a grade or drops out of school.
9  We use data from 
a variety of sources including administrative data from the Compensatory Program 
                                                   
9 There is very little overlap between the AGE schools and the nation-wide representative sample of 
schools with standardized test score data. As a consequence, there are too few schools with which to 
estimate robust effects of AGE on test scores. 
  9coverage from 1991 to 2003 to identify which schools receive the AGE and/or any of the 
other Compensatory Program interventions. Similarly, we use administrative data on 
other educational interventions to control for their presence in the school. Data on school 
level grade repetition, failure and drop out as well as other characteristics comes from the 
Mexican School Census (Censo Escolar). We use the 1990 and 2000 Population Census 
and the 1995 Conteo to construct socioeconomic locality indicators that will help us 
identify the evaluation sub-sample. The unit of analysis is the school.  
4.1. Estimation and Identification 
In principle, we would like to compare school performance when schools have an 
AGE to the counterfactual – i.e. quality for the same schools without an AGE at the same 
time. Since the counterfactual is never observed and we do not have a controlled 
randomized trial, we are forced to turn to quasi-experimental methods that mimic the 
counterfactual under reasonable conditions. 
We propose to use the phased rollout of the AGE to identify treatment and 
comparison groups, with the treatment group being schools getting AGE early and the 
comparison group being those who got AGE later. A major concern is that the late 
adopters could be different from the early adopters, and that these differences may be 
correlated with school performance. For example, the schools that received AGE early 
could be located in poorer rural areas while the ones that received it later could be in 
wealthier areas. In this case, the correlation between AGE and performance could be 
confounded with the wealth effect. Alternatively, it could be that schools with the 
strongest potential for improvement – schools with more engaged parents and motivated 
  10school staff – were incorporated at earlier stages. If so, our estimate of treatment would 
overestimate the true effect of the program.  
In principle, many of the types of (unobservable) characteristics that may 
confound identification vary across schools, but are fixed over time. A common method 
of controlling for time invariant unobserved heterogeneity is to use panel data and 
estimate difference in differences models. We use this identification strategy, and hence, 
compare the change in outcomes in the treatment group to the change in outcomes in the 
comparison group. By comparing changes, we control for observed and unobserved time-
invariant school characteristics as well as time-varying factors common to both 
comparison and treatment schools that might be simultaneously correlated with AGE and 
with indicators of performance.  The change in the comparison group is an estimate of the 
true counterfactual – i.e. what would have happened to the treatment group if there were 
no intervention. Another way to state this is that the change in outcomes in the treatment 
group controls for fixed characteristics and the change in outcomes in the comparison 
group controls for time-varying factors that are common to both comparison and 
treatment schools. 
Formally, we estimate the following regression specification of the difference in 
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where: 
•  Yst  is the proportion of school s’s students who fail an exam, repeat a grade or 
drop out in year t; 
                                                   
10 We take school year 1997-98 as the baseline year.  Evaluation years are from 1998-99 to 2001-02. 
  11•  AGEs,t-1 = 1 if school s had an AGE just before the start at t-1 – or early in the 
school year – of school year t;   
•  s α are school fixed effects;  
•  t η  are time dummies; 
•  lt ξ are state specific year fixed effects introduced to capture state specific common 
time effects (State demographic trends, changes in State education policies, 
changes in State economic conditions, for example) that are correlated with 
schooling outcomes;  
•  Xskt is a vector of time varying school characteristics and includes the student-to-
teacher ratio, the average number of students per class in the school (crowding 
index), and the presence of other educational interventions coexisting in the 
school (see Section 5.3).











ε ε  is the school average of individual error terms, which includes 
unobserved individual characteristics such as learning ability or disutility from 
studying. For the time being, we assume unobservables uncorrelated with the 
explanatory variables. 
We compute robust standard errors clustered at the school level to correct for 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.   
The coefficient  is the difference in difference estimate of the effect of the 
presence of AGE in the school on the outcome of interest. The specification in (1) 
1 ˆ β
                                                   
11 We have replaced missing values for school characteristics with the municipality average in the school 
year (or the state average in its default). We have included indicator variables to account for the 
replacement.  
  12assumes that the AGE require at least a full school year to be effective.  In a second 
specification, we decompose the AGE s,t-1 dummy in a set of dummies that equal one if 
the school has had AGE for one year and a second if the school has had AGE for two or 
more years. This addresses the question of whether the AGE impact on outcomes 
cumulates over time. 
4.2. Treatment and Comparison Groups  
As argued earlier, we exploit the geographic expansion of AGE over time to 
construct treatment and comparison groups. Our sample of analysis consists of non-
indigenous primary schools in rural areas that did not enroll in the Compensatory 
Program – and hence did not have AGE – before school year 1998-99 for which the 
targeting index was constructed.
12 We define the set of AGE treatment schools as the set 
of schools that first received AGE at the beginning of any school year between 1998-99 
and 2001-02, and had AGE continuously ever since.  Those that had not received AGE 
before school year 2002-03 constitute the comparison group.
13 Our final sample consists 
of a balanced panel of 6,027 rural non-indigenous primary schools that we observe 
continuously between 1995 and 2003.  Of these, 42 percent become AGE beneficiaries 
over the period.
14  
Table 1 shows summary statistics for a few school observable characteristics and 
for the dependent variables in 1997 (baseline) for AGE treatment and comparison 
                                                   
12 We limit on the sample to rural non-indigenous primary schools because the vast majority of AGE 
beneficiary schools are in rural areas and all indigenous schools were automatically incorporated when 
AGE first started in 1998 in these States. 
13 Because we only have AGE coverage data until 2003, we do not know whether schools in the 
comparison group received AGE at later dates.  
14 To allow comparison across outcomes, we restrict the sample to schools with complete information on 
outcomes.  Results are robust to the inclusion of schools with missing information for one or more of the 
outcomes. We also drop from the sample schools with extremely high numbers of students and/or teachers 
(top 0.5 percent of each distribution and bottom 1 percent of the distribution of students). We have also 
trimmed schools with values of the dependent variables in the top 0.5% of each distribution. 
  13schools. AGE treatment schools are significantly smaller on average: they have fewer 
students, teachers, and classrooms. However, treatment schools also seem to have similar 
learning outcomes prior to the intervention. Average grade failure at baseline is 10.0 
percent in treatment schools versus 9.9 in comparison schools. Similarly, baseline grade 
repetition is 9.5 percent in treatment schools versus 9.1 percent in comparison schools, 
and the drop out rate is 3.8 percent in treatments versus 4.2 in comparisons. While some 
of these differences are statistically significant, the order of magnitude of the differences 
is small.  
During the intervention period, schools in the comparison group have a 
significantly larger proportion of teachers in Carrera Magisterial (pay per performance 
teacher incentives scheme) but enroll a significantly lower share of students in 
Oportunidades (conditional cash transfer program).  Moreover, comparison schools are 
significantly less likely to receive any of the other Compensatory interventions. This 
suggests that there is a positive correlation between receiving AGE and receiving the 
other Compensatory Program benefits; in particular, the “school supplies” support and 
the “teacher training” support. 
4.3. Average Treatment Effects 
  Table 2 presents the estimates of the average treatment effect from equation (1). 
For each dependent variable, Model A specifies AGE as a single dummy and Model C 
specifies AGE as two dummies one for the first year on the program and the second for 
two or more years. In Model B, we add a treatment time trend. However, the treatment 
time trend is never significant. All estimations include school and time fixed effects, state 
specific time trends, and the time varying school characteristics listed above. 
  14Results show that AGE is statistically positively associated with improved grade 
failure and repetition. Specifically, there is a significant 0.5 percentage point reduction in 
grade failure and a 0.5 percentage point reduction in grade repetition in AGE treatment 
schools (Table 2, Models A). Given a mean baseline failure and repetition rate of roughly 
10 percent, these values imply around a 5 percent decrease in the proportion of students 
failing and repeating a grade in treatment schools. However, AGE seem to have no 
impact on the drop out rate.  Model B shows that these results are robust to including a 
treatment time trend. Model C shows that the impact of AGE is achieved in the first year 
and that impacts do not change with more years on the program.  Indeed, we cannot 
statistically reject the hypothesis that the two AGE coefficients in Model C are equal. 
The fact that we find no significant effects of AGE on intra-year drop out rates is 
not too surprising. Enrolment and completion rates at the primary school level in Mexico 
are very high – at over 96 percent – hence leaving little scope for improvement. As a 
result, the drop out is about 60 percent lower than the failure and repetition repetition 
rates. In addition, students in Oportunidades families need to be enrolled to obtain the 
cash benefit. We further discuss this issue later.   
 
5.  Threats to Identification 
The use of difference in differences controls for observed and unobserved time-
invariant school characteristics as well as time-varying factors common to both 
comparison and treatment schools that might be simultaneously correlated with AGE and 
with indicators of performance. However, the introduction of treatment in a school might 
respond to or be correlated with other time varying factors, such as political will, other 
  15educational interventions, sorting of students or parental pressure. If these factors also 
affect outcomes, then our estimates of impact will be biased. In the next subsections, we 
address each of these potential biases separately. We first test the validity of the key 
identification assumption of difference in difference models: the equality in the evolution 
of the outcome variables prior to the intervention. 
5.1.  Testing for Balance in Pre-Interventions Trends 
We present two tests of the equality of pre-intervention trends of the outcomes of 
interest between the groups of treatment and comparison schools. The difference in 
differences model uses the post intervention trend in the control group as an estimate of 
the counter-factual, i.e. what would have been the change in the treatment schools’ 
outcomes if they had not had AGE. If pre-intervention trends are not statistically 
different, then it is likely that the post intervention trends would have been the same 
without AGE. The argument is as follows: in the absence of the intervention, the 
evolution of the dependent variables during the post-intervention period (at t) should not 
be significantly different between treatment and comparison schools, had it not been 
significantly different in the pre-intervention period (at t’<t). 
Hence, we first estimate the following specification on pre-intervention data, i.e. 









t t lt s st u YR POTAGEs YR Y + + + + = ∑ ∑ δ γ ξ α       (2) 
where, 
•  s α are school fixed effects; 
•  lt ξ  are state specific time dummies;  
  16•  YRt’ are yearly dummy variables for all school years in the pre-intervention 
period; 
•  POTAGEs is a dichotomous indicator equal to 1 if school s is a potential treatment 
school; this is to say, if s will receive AGE for some or all of the treatment years 
(t =1998-2001); 
•  ust’ is an heteroskedastic disturbance that allows for correlation within schools 
over time. 
In this specification, the test δt’ =0 is equivalent to the test of the equality of the pre-
intervention trends between treatment and comparison schools at each time t’.  
In a second specification, we test the equality in pre-intervention trends between 
comparison schools and schools that entered the program in different years.  In this case, 









t t lt s st YR INAGEs YR Y υ λ γ ξ α + + + + = ∑∑ ∑          (3) 
where  INAGEsj  is a set of dummies that take on the value 1 if the school s started 
benefiting from the AGE intervention on year j= 1998,…, 2001.  Thus, the coefficients 
on the interaction with the year dummies, the λt’’s, capture differences in pre-intervention 
trends for schools entering the AGE scheme at different years.   
Table 3 reports the test of the difference in pre-intervention trends for the 
outcomes of interest: grade failure, grade repetition and intra-year drop out. For each 
dependent variable (reported in columns), the first column (Models A) corresponds to the 
estimation of specification (2) and the second column (Models B) to the estimation of (3). 
All specifications include school and time fixed effects and state-time specific trends.  As 
Model A estimates show, there are no significant differences in pre-intervention trends 
  17between treatment and comparison schools in any of the outcomes. Similarly, Model B 
estimates suggest that comparison schools are fairly similar to treatment schools that 
were phased-in into the AGE scheme at different years. Only one of the 30 estimated 
coefficients on the interaction terms comes up as significant at standard significance 
levels. 
5.2. Endogenous Program Placement Bias 
Program placement biases might arise if the state authority decided to allocate 
programs non-randomly in response to political considerations. For instance, the state 
government could assign benefits to more disadvantaged schools first given budget 
constraints. In this case, estimates would be downward biased. Alternatively, the state 
government could prioritize better performing schools in order to maximize the chances 
of success and improve its reputation as a good manager. Now, estimates would likely 
overestimate the true program impact. As shown in Tables 1 and 2, the characteristics of 
treatment and comparison schools are sufficiently different as to raise such concern. In 
addition, we know that the state authority had certain discretion over the type and timing 
of benefits that targeted beneficiary schools would receive.
 15  
We argue that the inclusion of school fixed effects controls for any time-invariant 
observed and unobserved heterogeneity across schools. Moreover, the balance in 
outcome pre-intervention trends between treatment and comparison schools – shown in 
the previous subsection – rules out any changes in school characteristics that are not a 
direct consequence of the schools’ acquired treatment status. Finally, the inclusion of 
separate state specific time dummies should capture any aggregate state time effects that 
                                                   
15 The State Government has a final say over the allocation of AGE (and the other Compensatory supports) 
and this process is unknown to the researcher.  
  18might be correlated with the allocation of treatment (shifts in government tastes, for 
instance) or with outcomes (changes in enrolment due to changes state demographics), 
and further minimizes the potential for this bias.  
5.3. Presence of Other Educational Interventions in the School 
An additional concern is whether part of the observed effects are driven by other 
policies also directed to improve schooling quality and accessibility that are 
simultaneously operating in the school. As noted, the inclusion of state specific time 
dummies captures any possible change in the allocation of resources to education within 
states over time. To absorb any remaining bias, we additionally include explicit controls 
for three other educational interventions. 
First, we control for the share of Oportunidades beneficiary students in the school 
as a measure of the intensity of the program in the school. Oportunidades, formerly 
known as Progresa, is a conditional cash transfer program that provides financial 
incentives for families to invest in the human capital of their children. Cash transfers are 
disbursed conditional on school aged children attending school and on household 
members engaging in a set of behaviors designed to improve health and nutrition 
(preventive checkups, prenatal care, and health education).  
Second, we include the proportion of teachers under Carrera Magisterial, a 
voluntary pay per performance scheme targeted to all educators. Principals and teachers 
are eligible for permanent wage increases if they perform well in an assessment process 
based on their education and experience and on their school performance (student and 
teacher test scores).
16  
                                                   
16  See Skoufias (2005) for a review of impact evaluations on the Oportunidades program. McEwan and 
Santibáñez (2005) provide an evaluation of the Carrera Magisterial scheme. 
  19Finally, we control for the presence of other (sporadic) interventions supported by 
the Compensatory Program in the school: provision of didactic supplies and school 
equipment, infrastructure building and maintenance, teacher training and performance 
based incentives to teachers. 
Because these programs are likely to be endogenous, interpretation of the 
estimated effects on the outcomes of interest must be looked at with some reservation. 
They are also highly correlated with the presence of AGE in the school, as Tables 1 and 2 
show. Nonetheless, their inclusion in the regression will provide additional evidence on 
the robustness of the effect of AGE if they do not substantially alter the value of the 
estimate of impact.  
Table 4 presents results. For each dependent variable, Models A1 and C1 are 
analogous to those in Table 2 but further introduce the proportion of Oportunidades 
beneficiaries and teachers in Carrera Magisterial in the school. The estimated effects of 
AGE on repetition and failure fall slightly after the inclusion of these covariates in the 
estimation (Model A1, Table 4), but remain significantly different form zero. There still 
is no estimated impact on drop out. In Models A2 and C2 we additionally control for all 
other interventions supported by the Compensatory Program. Including these extra 
variables does not further change the size of the estimated effect.  
Concerning the effect of these covariates on outcomes, we observe that the 
proportion of teachers under Carrera Magisterial and proportion of Oportunidades 
beneficiary students in the school significantly reduces repetition and failure. The later 
effect might be due to the fact that the Oportunidades scholarships increase with the 
grade of enrolment, and are conditional on attendance as well as on not repeating more 
  20than twice a grade. Oportunidades may also impact learning outcomes through the 
improved nutrition and health practices it enforces (reduced morbidity).  This is 
consistent with the growing literature that establishes strong positive effects of health on 
school performance (Miguel and Kremer 2004; Bobonis et al 2006).  Lastly, the other 
Compensatory program sub-interventions seem to have no impact.  
5.4. Changes in the Distribution of Students in the School 
The error term  st ε  in (1) includes unobserved student characteristics,  = ist θ {skills, 
ability, motivation}, that we have so far assumed uncorrelated with the observed 
treatment variables.  However, treatment might affect the skill mix of students enrolling 
in school. For instance, AGE schools might attract higher skill or more motivated 
students whose parents have a higher preference for education. Alternatively, AGE might 
enable schools to retain lower skill students who were not doing well academically and 
would otherwise have withdrawn. If these changes in total enrollment significantly alter 
the distribution of students’ skills in the school, then the treatment would be correlated 
with unobserved ability and the estimated effect biased.  
  Although it is difficult to determine the direction of the bias, we can nonetheless 
test for its existence by examining changes in enrollment in response to AGE.  In Table 5, 
we estimate (1) on total enrolment to test whether there is any significant difference in 
the evolution of enrolment between treatment and comparison schools. We find no effect 
of AGE on total enrollment. We therefore believe that changes in the distribution of 
student skills are unlikely to account for the observed effects in failure and repetition 
rates. 
 
  215.5. Student Learning vs. Parental Pressure 
Finally, we examine whether the effects observed on schooling outcomes are 
indeed the result of teachers influencing results in response to increased parental 
pressure. While, we cannot test this hypothesis with the administrative data available, we 
did ask principals about this possibility in the May 2006 survey interviews.
17 More 
specifically, we asked principals about parents’ reactions to the possibility of their 
children repeating a year or receiving a very poor grade. Less than 3 percent of principals 
reported that parents demanded that undeserving children be allowed to progress.   
According to principals, the vast majority of parents (97 percent) accepted that their child 
was failing or that they received a poor grade. Hence, although AGE makes parents more 
demanding in terms of teacher attendance and attention to children’s learning needs, they 
do not seem to make them pressure teachers to change grades for undeserving students.   
 
6.  Conclusions  
Mexico’s AGE aims to empower parent associations to improve school quality. 
We have provided quantitative empirical evidence that AGE improved intermediate 
school outcomes, namely reducing grade repetition and grade failure by 4 to 5 percent.  
These results are important as Manacorda (2007) and Marshall (2003) show that 
repetition and failure are associated with poor test performance and a higher probability 
of subsequent drop out. However, a limitation of the study is that we only have crude 
measures of school performance, rather than more sensitive measures such as test scores. 
                                                   
17 Section 3 describes the random sample of principals used and provides a summary of the main findings 
stemming from these interviews on parental involvement in the school as a result of AGE. 
  22Our qualitative results suggest that the pathways by which AGE improved 
performance were through increased parental participation in school matters, and 
improved relations and communication between parents and teachers.  Parents in schools 
with AGE were more likely to observe and complain about teacher absence and poor 
teaching.  And they were more likely to know when their child was not doing well and 
take corrective action.   
These results are consistent with theories laid out in the economics of identity and 
social exclusion (Akerlof and Kranton, 200 and 2005).  This work postulates that one’s 
identity enters the utility function of both the parent and the school director.  Social 
exclusion occurs when both believe that the parent does not deserve the benefit.  The 
AGE acts to change parental identity and gives them a seat at the table. Indeed, the lack 
of formal role for parents in the Argentine decentralization of schools may explain why 
Galiani et al (2008) found positive effects in wealthy communities, but no impact on 
schools in poorer communities. 
Finally, the results have important policy implications. Empowering parents in 
SBM is likely to strengthen the positive effects of decentralization.  However, while the 
quantitative effects of AGE are strong and consistent, there are albeit modest. The 
relative small size of the effects should not come as a surprise given that AGE is a very 
limited intervention. Interventions that greatly increase the power of parents could be 
considered and tested.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics by Treatment Status
Dependent Variables at Baseline (1997) N Mean SD N Mean SD t-stat
Failure Rate 2544 0.100 (0.061) 3483 0.099 (0.053) 0.203
Repetition Rate 2544 0.095 (0.060) 3483 0.091 (0.050) 2.953
Intra-Year Drop Out Rate 2544 0.038 (0.048) 3483 0.042 (0.042) -3.494
School Characteristics at Baseline (1997)
Number of Teachers 2544 3.593 (2.486) 3483 6.076 (3.903) -30.102
Number of Desks 2544 60.614 (55.633) 3483 97.878 (104.684) -17.831
Number of Classrooms 2544 6.227 (1.365) 3483 7.597 (2.696) -25.804
Total Student Enrollment 2544 91.682 (70.265) 3483 169.303 (128.833) -29.976
Other Interventions over Treatment Period (1998-2001)
Proportion of Teachers in Carrera Magisterial 2544 0.505 (0.376) 3483 0.546 (0.345) -8.644
Proportion of Oportunidades Students in the School 2544 0.317 (0.216) 3483 0.202 (0.218) 40.908
Proportion of Schools with School Supplies Support (CONAFE) 2544 0.435 (0.496) 3483 0.023 (0.150) 81.274
Proportion of Schools with Teacher Training Support (CONAFE) 2544 0.207 (0.405) 3483 0.012 (0.108) 47.421
Proportion of Schools with Infrastructure Support (CONAFE) 2544 0.034 (0.182) 3483 0.006 (0.074) 15.027
Proportion of Schools with Equipment Support (CONAFE) 2544 0.010 (0.099) 3483 0.003 (0.050) 6.926
Proportion of Schools with Teacher Incentives Support (CONAFE) 2544 0.006 (0.077) 3483 0.000 (0.019) 7.208
AGE Treatment Schools AGE Comparison Schools
Notes: AGE treatment schools are schools that receive the Apoyo a la Gestión Escolar (AGE) continuously starting in 1998 (or later) until 2001. Schools with extremely
high values of the dependent variables have been dropped (top 0.5% of each distribution and bottom 1% of the enrollment distribution). Sample restricted to schools with
complete information on all dependent variables.  
 
 
  27Model A Model B Model C Model A Model B Model C Model A Model B Model C
AGE =1 -0.005** -0.005** -0.005** -0.005** -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
AGE Received During 1 year =1        (1) -0.005** -0.005** -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
AGE Received Over 1 year =1           (2) -0.004* -0.004* -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Treatment Trend -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
School Fixed Effects  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
State by Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time-Varying School Characteristics Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Treatment Specific Trend N Y N N Y N N Y N
Prob > F-stat Joint Significance (1) = (2) = 0 - - 0.00 - - 0.00 - - 0.98
Prob > F-stat  (1) = (2) - - 0.71 - - 0.40 - - 0.88
Number of Observations  30135 30135 30135 30135 30135 30135 30135 30135 30135
Number of Schools 6027 6027 6027 6027 6027 6027 6027 6027 6027
Mean Dependent Variable  0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.04 0.04 0.04
Table 2: Effect of AGE on School Aggregate Educational Outcomes
DROP OUT RATE
Notes: +significant at the 10%, *significant at the 5%, **significant at the 1%. Robust SE clustered at the school level in parantheses. Time-varying school characteristics include the proportion
of students per teacher (student teacher ratio) and the proportion of students per class (class crowding index). 
FAILURE RATE REPETITION RATE
 
 
  28Table 3: Differences in Pre-Intervention Trends (1995 to 1997) between Intervened and Non-Intervened Schools
M o d e l  AM o d e l  BM o d e l  AM o d e l  BM o d e l  AM o d e l  B
Comparison Schools
Mean Dependent Variable in 1995 0.103** 0.103** 0.094** 0.094** 0.041** 0.041**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Difference in year 1996 0.011 0.012 0.009 0.011 0.014+ 0.014
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009)
Difference in year 1997 0.005 0.006 0.003 0.004 0.006 0.005
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
AGE Treatment Schools
Difference in year 1996                                            (1) 0.003 0.003 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Difference in year 1997                                           (2) -0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
AGE Treatment Schools by Starting Year
Difference in year 1996 * AGE starting in 1998      (3) 0.006 -0.001 0.004
(0.013) (0.013) (0.010)
Difference in year 1996 * AGE starting in 1999     (4) 0.006+ 0.008* -0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Difference in year 1996 * AGE starting in 2000     (5) -0.001 -0.003 0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Difference in year 1996 * AGE starting in 2001     (6) 0.004 0.004 0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Difference in year 1997 * AGE starting in 1998     (7) -0.004 -0.002 0.002
(0.013) (0.011) (0.012)
Difference in year 1997 * AGE starting in 1999      (8) -0.001 0.004 -0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Difference in year 1997 * AGE starting in 2000     (9) -0.003 -0.004 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Difference in year 1997 * AGE starting in 2001    (10) 0.003 0.003 0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
School Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
State by Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Prob > F-stat  Joint Significance (1) = (2) = 0 0.20 - 0.44 - 0.69 -
Prob > F-stat  Joint Significance (3) to (10) = 0 - 0.48 - 0.44 - 0.74
Number of Observations 18081 18081 18081 18081 18081 18081
Number of Schools 6027 6027 6027 6027 6027 6027
Notes: +significant at the 10%, *significant at the 5%, **significant at the 1%. Robust SE clustered at the school level in parantheses. 
FAILURE RATE REPETITION RATE DROP OUT RATE
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Model A1 Model C1 Model A2 Model C2 Model A1 Model C1 Model A2 Model C2 Model A1 Model C1 Model A2 Model C2
AGE =1 -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
AGE Received During 1 year =1       (1) -0.005** -0.004** -0.005** -0.005** 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
AGE Received Over 1 year =1          (2) -0.004* -0.004+ -0.003* -0.003+ 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Other Interventions
Proportion of Oportunidades Students in the School -0.009** -0.009** -0.009** -0.009** -0.008** -0.008** -0.008** -0.008** -0.013** -0.013** -0.013** -0.013**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Proportion of Teachers under Carrera Magisterial -0.003* -0.003* -0.003* -0.003* -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Other Compensatory Program Interventions
Infrastructure =1                                    (3) - - 0.001 0.001 - - 0.001 0.001 - - 0.000 0.000
- - (0.002) (0.002) - - (0.002) (0.002) - - (0.002) (0.002)
Equipment =1                                       (4) - - 0.000 0.000 - - -0.001 -0.001 - - -0.000 -0.000
- - (0.004) (0.004) - - (0.004) (0.004) - - (0.004) (0.004)
Incentives =1                                       (5) - - 0.002 0.002 - - 0.006 0.006 - - -0.002 -0.002
- - (0.008) (0.008) - - (0.008) (0.008) - - (0.006) (0.006)
Student Supplies =1                            (6) - - -0.001 -0.001 - - -0.002 -0.002 - - -0.001 -0.001
- - (0.002) (0.002) - - (0.002) (0.002) - - (0.001) (0.001)
Training =1                                           (7) - - 0.001 0.001 - - 0.002 0.003 - - 0.002 0.002
- - (0.002) (0.002) - - (0.002) (0.002) - - (0.002) (0.002)
School Fixed Effects  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
State by Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time-Varying School Characteristics Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
T r e a t m e n t  S p e c i f i c  T r e n d N NNNNNNN N NNN
Prob > F-stat  Joint Significance (1) = (2) = 0 - 0.00 - 0.01 - 0.00 - 0.01 - 0.87 - 0.77
Prob > F-stat  (1) = (2) - 0.62 - 0.57 - 0.35 - 0.30 - 0.68 - 0.53
Prob > F-stat Joint Significance (3) to (7) = 0 - - 0.95 0.94 - - 0.74 0.70 - - 0.83 0.80
Number of Observations  30135 30135 30135 30135 30135 30135 30135 30135 30135 30135 30135 30135
Number of Schools 6027 6027 6027 6027 6027 6027 6027 6027 6027 6027 6027 6027
Mean Dependent Variable 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
DROP OUT RATE
Table 4: Effect of AGE on School Aggregate Educational Outcomes Controlling for Other Educational Interventions          
Notes: +significant at the 10%, *significant at the 5%, **significant at the 1%. Robust SE clustered at the school level in parantheses. Time-varying school characteristics include the proportion of students per teacher (student teacher
ratio) and the proportion of students per class (class crowding index). 
FAILURE RATE REPETITION RATE
 
 
  30  31
Model A Model B Model C
AGE =1 0.404 0.318
(0.491) (0.353)
AGE Received During 1 year =1    (1) 0.190
(0.428)




School Fixed Effects  Y Y Y
State by Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y
Time-Varying School Characteristics Y Y Y
Treatment Specific Trend N Y N
Prob > F-stat  Joint Significance (1) = (2) = 0 - - 0.33
Prob > F-stat  (1) = (2) - - 0.14
Number of Observations  30135 30135 30135
Number of Schools 6027 6027 6027
Mean Total Enrollment 135.59 135.59 135.59
TOTAL STUDENT ENROLLMENT
Notes: +significant at the 10%, *significant at the 5%, **significant at the 1%. Robust SE clustered at the
school level in parantheses. 
Table 5: Does AGE Affect Total Student Enrollment? 
 